Abstract. When discussing protocol properties in the symbolic (DolevYao; term-based) model of cryptography, the set of cryptographic primitives is defined by the constructors of the term algebra and by the equational theory on top of it. The set of considered primitives is not easily modifiable during the discussion. In particular, it is unclear what it means to define a new primitive from the existing ones, or why a primitive in the considered set may be unnecessary because it can be modeled using other primitives. This is in stark contrast to the computational model of cryptography where the constructions and relationships between primitives are at the very foundation of the theory. In this paper, we explore how a primitive may be constructed from other primitives in the symbolic model, such that no protocol breaks if an atomic primitive is replaced by the construction. As an example, we show the construction of (symbolic) "randomized" symmetric encryption from (symbolic) one-way functions and exclusive or.
Introduction
One of the main tasks of cryptographic research is the building of secure and efficient protocols needed in various systems, and the construction of primitives that these protocols need. In the computational model [12, 21] of cryptography, where messages are modeled as bit-strings and the adversary as a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary, these primitives are constructed from simpler primitives, all the way down to certain base primitives (one-way functions or trapdoor one-way functions). The security properties of constructed primitives are derived from the properties of the base primitives. In the further development, only derived properties are important, making the whole approach modular (in theory).
The research in the symbolic model of cryptography (also known as the Dolev-Yao model, or perfect cryptography assumption) [10] has so far almost fully concentrated on the construction and analysis of cryptographic protocols. The messages are modeled as elements of some term algebra where the constructors of that algebra are seen as abstractions of cryptographic algorithms. In these treatments, the set of constructors has been fixed, causing the set of primitives (in our treatment, a primitive is a set of cryptographic algorithms) also to be fixed. There is no notion of implementing a primitive using some already existing primitives. This can hinder the generalization of certain kinds of results. For example, as stated, the impossibility result of [13] only applies to hash functions and XOR operations.
Another obvious application of our result is the modularization of security proofs of protocols in the symbolic model. While the symbolic model is generally more amenable to automatic analysis, certain commonly-used operations (exclusive or, and to lesser extent, Diffie-Hellman computation) are only handled with difficulty. Certain other operations (addition and multiplication, equipped with the theory for rings) are not handled at all. If these primitives are only used in a certain manner (e.g. to define the session key) then the construction of messages containing the uses of those primitives can be seen as a primitive itself, which may have properties that are simpler to handle by the automatic analysis.
The main difficulty in defining that a primitive has been securely implemented by a set of messages with variables is the difference in signatures. In general, the implementation satisfies different (more) equalities than the primitive. Hence the set of meaningful operations is richer and a simple observational equivalence is not a useful definition of security. In this paper, we give a suitable definition that in our opinion precisely captures the intuition of the equivalence of processes using the primitive operation and the processes using the implementation. We propose a technique for proving the security of the implementation. The technique does not require the prover to universally quantify over processes and contexts, but just provide an observationally equivalent process to a specific, the "most powerful" attacker against processes using the implementation of the primitive. We apply the technique by providing a secure implementation for the randomized symmetric encryption primitive in terms of one-way hash functions and exclusive or, thereby generalizing our impossibility result [13] .
The paper is structured as follows. Sec. 2 gives the necessary background on process calculi, introducing the applied pi-calculus that we will be working with. Sec. 3 provides the main definitions and proof techniques, while Sec. 4 applies them to the randomized symmetric encryption primitive. Finally, Sec. 5 reviews related work and Sec. 6 concludes.
Applied pi-calculus
Let us recall the syntax and semantics of the applied pi-calculus [2] , in which our results will be stated. We have a countable set Vars of variables, ranged over by x, y, . . ., and a countable set Names of names, ranged over by m, n, . . .. We let u, v, . . . range over both names and variables. Additionally, we have a set Σ of function symbols, ranged over by f, g, . . ., each with a fixed arity. Function symbols abstract cryptographic and other operations used by protocols. In the current paper, more often occurring function symbols besides tupling and projections are the ternary randomized encryption Enc(R, K, X) and binary decryption Dec(K, Y ), as well as the unary one-way (or hash) function H(X) and the binary XOR (written using infix notation) X ⊕ Y together with its nullary neutral element 0. A term in signature Σ, ranged over by M, N, . . . is either a name, a variable, or a function application f (M 1 , . . . , M k ), where the arity of f is k. Let T Σ (Vars ∪ Names) denote all terms over the signature Σ, where the atomic terms belong to the set Vars ∪ Names.
An equational theory E is a set of pairs of terms in signature Σ. It defines a relation = E on terms which is the smallest congruence containing E and is closed under the substitution of terms for variables and bijective renaming of names [20] . Equational theories capture the relationships between primitives defined in Σ. The properties of tupling are captured by the equations π n i ((x 1 , . . . , x n )) = E x i for all i and n (we let π n i denote the i-th projection from an n-tuple). Encryption and decryption are related by Dec(k, Enc(r, k, x)) = E x. The XOR-operation has its own set of equations capturing commutativity (
No equations are necessary to capture the properties of H. If E is clear from the context, we abbreviate M = E N as M = N .
Processes, ranged over by P, Q, . . ., extended processes, ranged over by A, B, . . ., and their structural equivalence are defined in Fig. 1 . We use − → x and − → M to denote a sequence of variables or terms. In the if-statement, the symbol = denotes equality modulo the theory E, not syntactic equality. The extended process { M / x } represents a process that has previously output M which is now available to the environment through the handle x. Variable x is free in { M / x }. As indicated by the structural equivalence, { M / x } can replace the variable x with M in any process it comes to contact with under the scope of νx. Here A[x ← M ] denotes the process A where all free occurrences of the variable x have been replaced with the term M , without capturing any free variables in M . If { M / x } is outside the scope of νx then we say that the variable x is exported. The domain of an extended process is the set of variables it exports. An extended process is closed if it exports all its free variables. The internal reduction relation describes a single step in the evolution of a process. As usual, we consider only well-sorted processes: all variables and names have sorts and all operations (conditional checking, communication, substitution) must obey them. In our sort system, there is a sort Data; the inputs and output of any function symbol have this sort. For any sequence of sorts T 1 , . . . , T l there is also a sort C T 1 , . . . , T l for channels communicating values of that sort. Let Proc(Σ) and Ctxt(Σ) denote the sets of all extended processes and evaluation contexts with function symbols from the set Σ. We refer to [2, 20] for details and justifications.
In this paper we want to state that two processes, where the second has been obtained from the first by replacing in it certain term constructors with their "implementations", are somehow indistinguishable. Observational equivalence, denoted ≈ is the standard notion capturing indistinguishability by all environments. For defining it, we denote with A ⇓ c the existence of an evaluation context C not binding c, a term M and a process P , such that A → * C[c M .P ]. 
Secure Implementation of Primitives
We start by defining the notions of cryptographic primitive and implementing a cryptographic primitive. A cryptographic primitive Prim is a subset of Σ, e.g. the randomized symmetric encryption primitive is R-ENC = {Enc, Dec, e r, is enc }. Beside the encryption and decryption function we also have a unary randomness extraction function with the equality e r(Enc(r, k, x)) = E r and the unary type verifier with the equality is enc (Enc(r, k, x)) = E true, where true is a nullary operation. Many implementations of symmetric randomized encryption (in the computational model) allow the randomness used in encryption to be recovered from the ciphertext, and our intended implementation has the same property. The possibilities it gives to the adversary must be reflected at the primitive level. Another reason for including e r and is enc in R-ENC is, that the security proof of our implementation in Sec. 4 makes significant used of these symbols.
An implementation assigns to each function symbol f ∈ Prim a term f i over Σ with no free names and with free variables x 1 , . . . , x arity(f ) . The implementation defines a mapping (a second-order substitution) tr from terms to terms, replacing each occurrence of each f ∈ Prim in the term with f i . Formally,
To make the translation well-behaved with respect to the equational theory E we require tr (M ) = E tr (N ) for each (M, N ) ∈ E. The mapping tr can be straightforwardly extended to processes, extended processes and evaluation contexts. When defining secure implementations, we want to state that A and tr (A) are somehow indistinguishable for all extended processes A.
Example 1. We can give the following implementation to the randomized symmetric encryption primitive R-ENC. Let eq? be a ternary function symbol. Let eq?(x, x, y) = E y be a pair of terms in the equational theory E. Let the implementation of R-ENC be
(recall that the arguments of Enc were the formal randomness x 1 , the key x 2 and the plaintext x 3 , while the arguments of Dec were the key x 1 and the ciphertext x 2 ). The application of H to several arguments denotes the application of H to the tuple of these arguments.
Our implementation of Enc(r, k, x) is similar to the OFB-or CTR-modes of operation of block ciphers [11] . The randomness r (the initialization vector IV) is included in the ciphertext and used, together with the key k, to generate a random-looking sequence which is then reversibly combined with the plaintext x. Hence the result of the OFB-or CTR-mode can be modelled as (r, H(k, r) ⊕ x). Formal encryption also provides integrity of the plaintext. Thus we add the third component H(k, r, x) as a formal message authentication code. Finally, we note that if the randomness r is reused (this case is ruled out in computational definitions, but in this paper we are considering the most general way of using the primitives), then the adversary is able to find x ⊕ x from the implementations of Enc(r, k, x) and Enc(r, k, x ) by XOR-ing their second components. Such recovery of x ⊕ x is not possible with primitive Enc. We rule out the reuse of randomness by making it depend also on the key and the plaintext -we replace r in the second component H(k, r) ⊕ x by H(k, r, x). In this construction, similarities to the resettable encryption [22] can be seen. But the use of H(k, r, x) in two roles seems to be novel to our construction.
The decryption Dec(k, y) recovers the plaintext by extracting H(k, r, x) from y, XOR-ing the second component of y with H(k, H(k, r, x)), and checking the authentication tag.
The only pair in E relating Enc and Dec to other primitives (or each other) is Dec(k, Enc(r, k, x)) = E x. It is simple to verify that
The implementation of is enc is unsatisfactory because it declares all triples to be ciphertexts, but in the following we'll see how to improve it.
Defining the secureness of the implementation as A ≈ tr (A) for all extended processes A immediately leads to problems. Consider e.g. the following process
(1) It generates a ciphertext and then proceeds to check whether it is a triple or not. A triple means that we are dealing with the implementation, while a nontriple is a sign of using primitive encryption. Clearly, we have to restrict the processes A if we want to have a meaningful definition. There should be a set of function symbols Σ fb ⊆ Σ that it is forbidden to apply. These function symbols express the "internal details" of the implementation of the primitive. A process just using the primitive should have no need to use them. Denote Σ ok = Σ\Σ fb .
Example 2. It is unreasonable to restrict A from constructing and decomposing triples. We thus introduce(·, ·, ·) as the tagged [9, 6] version of tripling andH as the tagged version of hashing (these can be thought of as normal operations with one extra argument that is fixed as a constant that is used nowhere else). We use these operations to implement R-ENC. The use of these operations, as well as the projectionsπ 1 ,π 2 andπ 3 from tagged triples, should be unnecessary for any process A whose security we care about (and for which we desire A ≈ tr (A)).
Continuing our running example, we redefine
The forbidden set of function symbols is Σ fb = {H,π 1 ,π 2 ,π 3 ,(·)}. The newly introduced symbols are related to each other byπ i ((x 1 , x 2 , x 3) ) = E x i . No other (M, N ) ∈ E contains those function symbols. We see that the tagging of triples induces the tagging also for encryptions.
In the definition of observational equivalence, the usage of function symbols in Σ fb has to be restricted in evaluation contexts, too, or the test (1) can still be performed in cooperation with the process A (generating the ciphertext) and the context (testing whether it is a tagged triple). We see that the contexts must also be translated -if A is enveloped by C[ ], then tr (A) should be enveloped by tr (C)[ ]. This models the fact that both A and C implement the primitive Prim in the same manner (otherwise they would be different primitives). Thus we modify the notion of observational equivalence as follows. While we can show that A ≈ tr tr (A) for all extended processes in the randomized symmetric encryption example, the relation ≈ tr also does not satisfactorily capture the meaning of secure implementation. Namely, the context is restricted in the operations it can perform; as it cannot use the function symbols in Σ fb , it cannot attack the implementation of the cryptographic primitive. We would like to have a simulation-based definition -for any attacker D attacking tr (A) there is an attacker S attacking A, such that A | S and tr (A) | D are indistinguishable [7, 17] . This motivates our definition of secure implementation.
Definition 3. Let Σ be a signature and E an equational theory over it. An implementation of a cryptographic primitive Prim ⊆ Σ = Σ ok∪ Σ fb with forbidden symbols Σ fb is secure if for any closed process A ∈ Proc(Σ ok ) and any closed process D ∈ Proc(Σ) (the adversary) there exists a closed process S ∈ Proc(Σ ok ) (the simulator), such that A | S ≈ tr tr (A) | D. Here the mapping tr is induced by the implementation.
The definition captures the notion of tr (A) being at least as secure as A -anything that the environment tr (C) can experience when interacting with tr (A), it (as C) can also experience when interacting with A. Hence, if nothing bad can happen to C when running together with A, then nothing bad can happen to tr (C) when running together with tr (A). The first can be established by analyzing A (and possibly C), without considering the implementation details of the cryptographic primitive.
An immediate consequence of the definition is, that the process A we're trying to protect does not have to be quantified over. We propose the following method for showing the security of a certain implementation. We rewrite any process D as νc q .(D ctrl | VM ) where VM does not depend on D (it only depends on Σ) and D ctrl does not contain any function symbols. Intuitively, the process D ctrl sends computation requests to the process VM (the "virtual machine") which performs those computations and stores their results in its database, responding with handles (new names) that the process D ctrl can later use to refer to them. The channel c q is used for communication between the two processes. We then construct a process VM sim and show that VM sim ≈ tr VM (this construction is primitive-specific). As tr
By defining a suitable bisimulation [2] , it will be straightforward to show that D ≈ νc q .(D ctrl | VM ). To complete the security proof, we only need refer to the following proposition that is given here in a somewhat more general form. The process VM is depicted in Fig. 2 . We use syntactic sugar u(=key, − → x ).P for the process u(z, − → x ).if z = key then P else u z, − → x that reads a tuple of values from the channel u and continues as P , with the restriction that the first component of the tuple must be equal to key. The VM process can "obey" the commands for putting a new value in the database (input: the value; output: a handle to it), getting a value from the database (input: handle; output: corresponding value) and applying a function symbol f to the values in the database (input: handles to arguments; output: handle to result). Here "put", "get", and "comp f " for each function symbol f ∈ Σ are fixed free names. The process VM gives its output on a channel c b that is given together with the input. of sort Data and C(. . .), respectively. We see that data is handled by the virtual machine, while the values of sort "channel" are not affected by the translation. The bisimilarity relates each closed process P to a processP = (
where N is a subset of free names in P and Store is a parallel composition N that are mapped to the same terms by Store. One transition step of P may correspond to several internal steps ofP . The processes at intermediate steps are also related to P .
Security of the Implementation of Randomized Symmetric Encryption
We have to present a process VM sim , such that VM sim ≈ tr VM . The process VM performs computations on behalf of the processes knowing the channel name c q . Given handles to values v 1 , . . . , v k , it returns the handle to value f (v 1 , . . . , v k ), where f ∈ Σ = Σ ok∪ Σ fb . The process VM sim must respond to the same computation (and put/get) queries, but it may not use the operations in Σ fb . These queries must be handled in some other way. For the R-ENC primitive, the set Σ of function symbols contains at least tupling, projections, Enc, Dec and the operations in Σ fb outlined in Example 2. Any other operations must be handled by VM sim , too. In the following, we are not going to present VM sim as precisely as VM in Fig. 2 , but we explain in detail the operations it performs and appeal to the Turing-completeness of π-calculus [16] in order to convince ourselves that such VM sim exists.
The process VM sim responds to the same commands as VM in the same manner (receives a channel for sending its output as part of the input). It keeps a table T val of values it has received or constructed. Each entry (row) R in T val has the fields "handle" (denoted R.hnd), "value" (denoted R.v) and extra arguments for bookkeeping (denoted R.args). For the rows R where R.v has been computed by VM sim after a request to apply a symbol in Σ fb , the extra arguments record that request.
The process VM sim also keeps a second table T ct of ciphertexts it has seen or constructed. Each row R in this table has the fields R.ct (the ciphertext), R.snd , R.thd (the second and third component of the ciphertext, considered as a tagged triple), R.k (the correct key) and R.pt (the corresponding plaintext). The field ct is a unique identifier for rows in this table. We let T ct [M ] denote the row of the table T ct where the field ct equals M .
The process VM sim handles the commands as follows. Storing. To a store a value M , the process VM sim generates a new name n and a new row R in the table T val with R.hnd = n, R.v = M and R.args = ⊥. If M is a valid ciphertext (checked by comparing is enc (M ) to true) and T ct does not yet contain a row T ct [M ] , then this row is added, the field ct is initialized to M and other fields to ⊥. The command returns n. Retrieving. To retrieve a value by handle n, the process VM sim locates the row R of T val with R.hnd = n, and replies with R.v. If there is no such R, there will be no answer (This is similar to the behavior of VM ).
Computing. To apply a function symbol f to values with handles n 1 , . . . , n k , the process VM sim locates the rows R 1 , . . . , R k of T val with R i .hnd = n i for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If some R i cannot be located, or if k is different from the arity of f , there will be no answer. Otherwise, VM sim generates a new name n and a new row R in T val with R.hnd = n, and replies with n. Before replying, it also defines R.v and R.args as follows.
-If f ∈ Σ ok , then R.v = f (R 1 .v, . . . , R k .v) and R.args = ⊥. Additionally,
• If the operation was Enc and the row T ct [R.v] was not present, then it is added (and the field ct initialized with R.v). The field k of this row is set to R 2 .v and the field pt to R 3 .v.
• If the operation was Dec, the row T ct [R 2 .v] exists (recall that ciphertext was the second argument of Dec), and R 1 .v was the correct key (checked by comparing Enc(e r(R 2 .v), R 1 .v, R.v) to R 2 .v) then the field k of this row is updated to R 1 .v and the field pt is updated to R.v. -If f ∈ Σ fb and there exists a row R , such that R .args indicates that the same computation query has been made to VM sim before (i.e. R .args names the operation f and the arguments R 1 .v, . . . , R k .v), then let R.v = R .v and R.args = R .args. In the following cases, we assume that the same query has not been made before. -If f isH and the argument R 1 .v is a triple (x, y, z) then check whether T ct contains a row T ct [M ] , where M = Enc(y, x, z). If such row exists, then its fields k and pt are updated to x and z. If such row does not exist, then it is created and its fields k and pt likewise set to x and z. If
.thd , otherwise it generates new names n ,n, sets both R.v and T ct [M ] .thd to n , and adds a new rowR to T val with hnd =n, v = n and args = (π 3 , M ). Next, it generates new namesñ,n and adds a two new rowsR,R to the table T val withR.hnd =ñ,R.hnd =n,
.snd ⊕ z. Otherwise it generates a new name n , setsR.v to n and T ct [M ] .snd to n ⊕ z, and adds a new row to T val with hnd = ⊥, v = n ⊕ z and args = (π 2 , M ). We see that if VM sim is requested to create a value that may serve as the third component of a ciphertext then this ciphertext will also appear in the table T ct and the entire row corresponding to it will be initialized. Also, all entries in that row will also appear in T val . 
We see that the result of applying the symbol(·) is always a ciphertext. If the three components would result in an invalid ciphertext, then we generate this ciphertext using a throw-away key, thereby making its decryption impossible. In all cases of handling a function symbol f from Σ fb , the process VM sim sets the fields args of the newly created row R of T val to (f, R 1 .v, . . . , R k .v), where R 1 .hnd, . . . , R k .hnd were the arguments given to f .
Proof (Sketch). Both VM and VM sim maintain a database that maps from handles to values, update it according to certain rules, and reveal the values of queried elements. A context C ∈ Ctxt(Σ ok ) trying to distinguish VM and VM sim (i.e. having a channel c, such that C[VM sim ] ⇓ c, but tr (C)[VM ] ⇓ c) will at some point query for certain elements of the database and then perform a test (check the equality of two terms built from the queried elements), the result of which determines whether the communication on c happens. We will show that at no point in the execution there exists a test that can tell apart the databases of VM and VM sim . Formally, a test is a pair of test messages M, N ∈ T Σ ok (Names ∪ Refs), where Refs is the set of "references" to the cells of the database of VM sim . A reference r ∈ Refs can either be n.v, where n is the handle of a row R in T val , or T ct [M e ].field , where the ciphertext M e identifies a row in T ct and the value of field ∈ {snd , thd } in this row is different from ⊥. The context C can access these references by using get-queries, possibly preceded by a compπ 2 or compπ 3 query. The names that a test message may contain are free names generated by C.
If Example 3. Suppose that the context C[ ] issues the following commands: n 1 ← put(r); n 2 ← put(k); n 3 ← put(x); n 4 ← comp (,,) (n 2 , n 1 , n 3 ); n 5 ← compH (n 4 ); n 6 ← comp (,) (n 2 , n 5 ); n 7 ← compH (n 6 ); n 8 ← comp ⊕ (n 7 , n 3 ); and finally n 9 ← comp( ,,) (n 1 , n 8 , n 5 ). Through these queries, the handle n 9 will correspond to the ciphertext Enc(r, k, x). Let M = (n 9 .v, n 5 .v, T ct [Enc(r, k, x)].thd ) and n hash be a new name generated by VM sim .. Then M sim = (Enc(r, k, x), n hash , n hash ) and M real = ((r,H(k,H(k, r, x)) ⊕ x,H(k, r, x)),H(k, r, x),H(k, r, x)).
We show that the following claim holds. Claim (*) At any step of the computation of VM sim , the equivalence M sim = N sim ⇔ M real = N real holds for all M, N ∈ T Σ ok (Names ∪ Refs). If (*) would not hold for some M , N at some step of VM sim , then we can show that for some M prev , N prev ∈ T Σ ok (Names ∪ Refs) the claim (*) would not hold at the previous step. We will not present the full analysis of cases in this paper, but as an example, consider the computation step where f isH and the argument R 1 .v is a triple (x, y, z). If M and N do not refer to any newly created entries of T val or T ct , then we can set M prev = M and N prev = N . Otherwise we obtain M prev and N prev by replacing the new entries in M and N as follows. Let M e = Enc(y, x, z). We consider four possibilities, depending on whether T ct [M e ].thd is defined (1&2) or not (3&4), and whether T ct [M e ].snd is defined (1&3) or not (2&4). Fig. 4 outlines the replacements for references to possibly new entries in T ct and T val . An empty cell indicates that the reference existed before the current computation step, or the row was not created in this computation step. We refer to the description of VM sim for the meaning of new rows and definitions of new names. The table in Fig. 4 In such manner we obtain a bisimilarity modulo implementation between VM sim and VM even for the case where their entire databases are public. Hence also VM sim ≈ tr VM .
Related Work
The implementation of cryptographic primitives is a certain case of process refinement. While various aspects of refinement have been explored [3, 19, 18] , mostly concerned with the refinement of possible behaviors of a process, the work reported in this paper has primarily been inspired by the notions of universal composability [7] and (black-box) reactive simulatability [17] , both originating in the computational model of cryptography. The notion of indifferentiability by Maurer et al. [15] is similar. These definitions have been recently carried over to the symbolic model by Delaune et al. [9] . In all these definitions, there is a notion of two interfaces -one for the "legitimate" user and one for the adversaryof the process under investigation. Two processes can be equivalent (or in the refinement relation) only if the user's interface stays the same. The adversary's interface can change and a simulator process is used to translate between different interfaces. This is in contrast to our problem, where the user's interface is also naturally considered as changing, and the replacement of the primitive with the implementation is more invasive for the user process. While we think that the definition of secure implementation could be based on the notion of strong simulatability by Delaune et al. [9] , the setup would be less natural and possibly the virtual machine process VM has to be included even in the definition.
The question of secure protocol composition is related to the issues of implementability of abstract processes or primitives. In recent work, Ciobâcȃ and Cortier [8] give sufficient conditions for the security of composition of two protocols using arbitrary primitives to follow from the security of stand-alone protocols. Interestingly, they have a similar restriction on primitives used by different protocols -the sets of primitives have to be disjoint.
Regarding the study of implementability of primitives, it is worth mentioning that in the same paper where they introduced applied pi-calculus, Abadi and Fournet [2, Sec 6.2] also considered an implementation of the MAC primitive, inspired from the HMAC construction [5] . Still, the construction is ad hoc and puts restrictions on how the process uses certain values.
Conclusions
We have explored the notion of securely implementing a cryptographic primitive in the symbolic model, and presented definitions that are more general and convenient to use than definitions that could be obtained from the application of existing treatment of process refinement and simulation. We have shown the usefulness of the proposed definition by demonstrating a secure implementation for the randomized symmetric encryption primitive. Future work in this topic would involve a systematic treatment of the implementability of common cryptographic primitives from each other. Obtained reductions and simulations may also give new insights to the security proofs in the computational model. The first step in this direction would be the analysis of the Luby-Rackoff construction [14] for constructing pseudorandom permutations ("deterministic" symmetric encryption, where Enc(k, ·) and Dec(k, ·) are inverses of each other) from random functions (modeled in the symbolic model as hashing) and exclusive or. Another line of future work is the application of the results of this paper, as well as [9] , to the analysis of complex protocols.
